Revisiting Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī

Abstract

In this paper, I attempt (1) a further elucidation and defense of some of the things I said in my article "Critical Reflections on Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī" (Sharma in Nagoya Stud Indian Cult Buddh 29:1–38, 2011) and (2) a response to Professor Claus Oetke's criticisms (J Indian Philos 40(4):371–394, 2012) of "a number of views which have been propagated" by me in my article. Although some additional issues have been raised, broadly, the themes addressed here are the same three as were the object of my investigation in that paper: namely, Nāgārjuna's emptiness (svabhāva–śūnyatā) doctrine; his denial that he has any thesis to advance or buttress; and his onslaught on the pramāṇa theory. Toward the end I argue that if I understand Nāgārjuna correctly, then what that thinker ends up providing is a criterion, not of reality, but of unreality, and that this stance, speaking philosophically, is tantamount to nihilism.