Dharmakīrti and His Commentators on the Process of Perceptual Activities

Abstract

In the tradition of Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660), perception is, by definition, free from conceptual construction. Insofar as perception is thus, it lacks the nature of determining its object. Without identifying its object, how does perception lead one to a successful action? Perception in isolation would not be pramāṇa unless it is supplemented by perceptual judgement. This paper looks at how Dharamkīrti and his commentators offer solutions to the contradiction between perception's foundational role and its seeming dependence on conceptual construction. The key point in their proposed solutions is the argument that perception is understood in accordance with two distinct perspectives of the moment (kṣaṇa) and the continuum (santāna). Perception from the perspective of the moment has the activities of 'grasping' (grahaṇa) and 'ascertaining' (niścaya). The 'grasping' induces perceptual awareness to be possessed of the image (ākāra) of an object-moment; the 'ascertaining' identifies its object in the form of "this is something." Perception from the perspective of the continuum, on the other hand, consists of a series of the first moment of sense perception and its subsequent moments of mental perception. It is a continuous process allowing one to attain or avoid a thing that s/he sees. The fulfilment of a purpose is achieved not through a perception-moment but through a perception-continuum. It is worthy stressing, however, that in a very strict sense, the perception-moment alone is ultimately real. Perception from the perspective of the moment is purely epistemological while perception from the perspective of the continuum is pragmatic.